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Miracles and Physics 
STANLEY L. JAKI 
The most incredible thing about miracles is that they happen. 
—G. K. Chesterton* 
PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
In writing about miracles it is hardly possible not to think first of David Hume. 
In many quarters he is remembered as the one who had once and for all divested 
miracles of intellectual respectability. Such a reputation is part of the awe in which 
Hume as a man of intellect is still held. Yet, as far as intellectual construction goes, 
Hume himself admitted that his theory of understanding resembled not so much 
an edifice as a heap of bricks.' To his credit he also perceived that his premises 
provided only for one kind of glue, plain sentiment or mere habit, to make those 
bricks stick together into some sort of intellectual framework. About such an 
outcome Hume was both very despondent in his truly philosophical moments and 
also very outspoken. Already his first major philosophical work, The Treatise on 
Human Nature, contains the unabashed declaration, "Reason is, or ought only to 
be, the slave of passions."2 That a leader of the Enlightenment did not rather speak 
of the enslavement of passions to reason may tell something of the true nature of 
the light generated by that much glorified movement. To be sure, by "passions" 
Hume meant a dignified, quiet, urbane comportment, a foremost existential 
commodity in his eyes. Indeed all of Hume's philosophy was meant to be a shield 
against harsh, disturbing truths, especially the ones that bespeak of man's sub-
ordination to transcendental dimensions. He correctly perceived that none of 
those dimensions were a potential threat to a tensionless lifestyle if the idea of God 
were a matter of mere wishful thinking. 
Hume's relentless effort to justify intellectually a Weltanschauung free of 
transcendental constraints was in part a reaction to Calvinist tenets, zealously 
preached in the Edinburgh of his youth, about God's wrath on those He had 
positively predestined to hell. Another source was Hume's own personal make-up 
in which Epicurean traits, as amply revealed by his classic portraits, clearly 
dominated. Epicurus, who figures prominently in the closing section of Hume's 
*The Innocence of Father Brown (1911: Penguin Books, 1950) p. 11. 
Dr. Stanley L. Jaki, a Hungarian-born Catholic priest of the Benedictine order, 
with doctorates in physics and systematic theology, is distinguished university 
professor at Seton Hall University (South Orange, NJ) and the 1987 recipient of 
the Templeton Prize. 
THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL VOL. 42 No. 1 1987 
6 Jaki 
Enquiry, was certainly Hume's model in seeking the intellectual grounds for a 
peace of mind which consisted in being left alone by the gods. 3 
Nothing has, of course, ever been so much a threat to that ideal of splendid 
isolation as the One for whom the "Hound of Heaven" is still the psychologically 
most expressive name. 4 Awareness of Him has three main sources of which one, 
moral consciousness or the sense of the holy, affected Hume little if at all. In a 
sense, however civilized, he was a counter image of a Bunyan, a Wesley, let alone of 
John Henry Newman. 5 He did not pretend indifference toward the two other 
sources, one philosophical, the other historical. This is not to suggest that his style 
showed emotional overtones as he went about dissecting the classical proofs of the 
existence of God: the cosmological and the teleological. He skillfully played the 
role of uninterested bystander intent only on incontrovertible verities. He could 
not, however, mask his sarcastic contentment as he completed his picking apart the 
cosmological argument with a celebration of the idea of aborted, incoherent, 
botched-up universes. 6 
That such an outcome was destructive of the notion of universally valid laws did 
not seem to bother him. Nor did he seem to be mindful of the fact that years earlier 
his attack on miracles 7 assumed the notion of immutable laws of nature. He also 
failed to come to grips with the fact that on the basis of the bare inductionism he 
advocated one could never establish the existence of such laws. An inductionism 
severed from metaphysics could not yield that completeness which was meant by 
universally and permanently valid laws. Most importantly, Hume did not offer 
satisfactory explanation of the role he accorded in his philosophy to the 
recognition'of facts. As far as he was a sensationist or empiricist philosopher he 
had to grant equal credibility to the recognition of any fact, usual or unusual. That 
recognition had to be certain, if the philosophy built on it was to give assurance of 
certainty. But as far as he was a genuinely Humean philosopher, who subordinated 
reason to sentiments, he had to part with his professed impartiality vis-à-vis any 
kind of fact, usual or unusual. But partiality for some facts, which meant distrust 
for others, invited uncertainty about all facts. This is why when arguing against 
miracles Hume switched grounds. 8 From a mere probability argument against 
miracles (the trustworthy witnessing of regular recurrences far outweighed that of 
exceptional events) he went on dismissing entirely the credibility of witnesses 
(whatever their number, learnedness, and integrity) on behalf of exceptional or 
"miraculous" events. Behind such a tactical shift there had to be a fundamental 
consideration at play. Hume gave a glimpse of it as in the same context he declared, 
"If the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common 
sense."9 Hume's philosophy in general and his arguments against miracles in 
particular, are pivoted on the meaning he gave to common sense. 
In Hume's century common sense had many champions, the first of them being 
the Jesuit Claude Buffier, today almost completely forgotten. They all believed 
that common sense was the best assurance for certainty about the existence of 
external reality, that is, of objective facts, things, and events. ) 0 That Father 
Bailer's contention had no less an admirer than Voltaire," was not without a 
common though least noted instructiveness. The praises of an unsound philosophe 
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were not the clue toward the best philosophical meaning which an expression, be it 
common sense, was susceptible of. Insofar as it became equated with mere 
common opinion, it certainly had no chance in securing, and certainly not among 
philosophers, a certainty about the reality of objective facts. That a commonly 
shared opinion is a most variable commodity was implied in the phrase, "climate of 
opinion," made popular early in this century by Whitehead, who borrowed it from 
a "seventeenth-century writer" (Joseph Glanvill) without naming him. 12 
A recall of the times which witnessed the coining of that phrase should not 
appear useless for Christian theologians. They all, of course, know that defense of 
miracles has from those times on been an increasingly uphill battle against the 
climate of opinion taken for common sense. But perhaps not all of them are aware 
of the unsoundness of a defense of miracles that seeks an ally in the successive 
climates of opinion, philosophical and scientific. As will be clear later, the present 
status of that defense provides much for a new chapter in a now old story. That 
there will be no end to it may be surmised by those mindful of a biblical phrase with 
a sceptical touch, "There is nothing new under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 1:9). In respect 
to controversies about miracles, history turns out to be once more the past written 
in that present tense in which grammarians have long ago recognized the 
beckoning of the future. 
But there is an additional reason in a paper on miracles and science to go back to 
the past in order to understand the present and be prepared at least for the 
immediate future. The reason relates to the measure to which science contributed 
to the formation of climate of thought--as difficult to escape as the air one 
breathes-:ever since the days of Glanvill. Those days saw the rise of Newtonian 
science with all its dazzling successes that opened unsuspected vistas in man's 
understanding of nature. No less dazzling, though in an opposite or blinding sense, 
were some philosophical presuppositions grafted on that science by men of science, 
Newton included, dabbling in philosophy, and by philosophers with little if any 
expertise in science. 
The chief and strictly scientific lure in that dubious game was the inverse square 
law. Had the seventeenth century not been the age of scientific genius, it might have 
witnessed serious interest in its own immediate intellectual past. As that past was in 
good part a matter of printed record, disregard for it could not be excused with a 
reference to the difficulty of gathering manuscript material, a task difficult even in 
this age of instant copies and tele-copying. Even a cursory reading of the printed 
record in question, say of the works of Kepler, Horrocks, and Hooke, would have 
shown that the inverse square law was not a generalized statement derived from 
individual observations or experiments. Such an interpretation of the provenance 
of the inverse square law would have fitted only the empiricist-inductionist strait-
jacket tailored by Bacon for science as its foolproof method. For that garment, 
which only some foolhardy amateurs cared to don, no scientific genius of the 
century of genius had any use. Certainly not Newton. But Newton was also a 
genius in that he was most unwilling to credit other geniuses. Because of his 
jealousy of Hooke, Newton did not give enough credit to Hooke's ideas on the 
inverse square law of gravitation. 13 To anyone familiar with Leibniz's work, 
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equally suspect would appear Newton's claims about his having been the sole 
discoverer of infinitesimal calculus. 
Newton certainly belied his own overbearing self-centeredness when he voiced a 
twelfth-century statement (resurrected in the seventeenth-century debate concern-
ing old and new learning) that the moderns saw farther because they were sitting on 
the shoulders of giant forebears. 14 Newton certainly had such a giant to help him 
see the inverse square law loom large on his mental horizon. The giant was none 
other than Kepler whose three laws of planetary motion were mediated to Newton 
through a little-appreciated mid-seventeenth-century English astronomer, Jere-
miah Horrocks. Those three laws and Huygens' law of centrifugal force could 
easily be combined in such a way as to yield the inverse square law. 
Whether Newton had performed early enough that elementary algebraic 
operation is disputed. 15 But he did not need to do so in order to convince himself 
about the validity of the inverse square law. As one with keen interest in optics, 
Newton was certainly familiar with Kepler's explicit statements on the decrease of 
light intensity with the square of distance from a point source. 16 Nor could Newton 
be ignorant of the fact that Kepler's own certainty about that law of optics was not 
based at all on observations. Reliable photometry was still two centuries away. 
Kepler's certainty rested on an a priori philosophical assumption about nature. 
According to that assumption space was homogeneous. The spreading of any 
physical effect—optical, thermal or gravitational—in such a space could only follow 
the inverse square law. Those aware of the influence of the Cambridge Neoplaton-
ists on young Newton, with their markedly a priori speculations, and of old 
Newton's divinization of homogeneous Euclidean space as God's sensorium," will 
easily perceive the irresistible attractiveness which Kepler's train of thought had to 
have on Newton. The latter had been fully convinced about the inverse square law 
of gravitation long before he compared the fall of the moon in its orbit with the fall 
of an object on the earth and before he had elegantly derived that law from the 
notion of a central field of force. 
The first important thing to note here is the a priori certainty as the source of 
Newtonian science pivoted on the inverse square law of gravitation. This source 
was duly and quickly overlooked as Newtonian science proved ever more 
successful, but it did not fail to act less potently. Newton could lull himself into 
believing that he was really a "Newtonian" natural philosopher, starting from facts, 
experiments, and observations and never from hypotheses or postulates. Few 
leading men of science have ever indulged in so many a priori hypotheses as the one 
who boasted: hypotheses non fingo. 18 
These historical details about seventeenth-century science will reveal their 
bearing on our topic as soon as one notes the second important point. It is implied 
in the first about the certainty felt on a priori grounds about the inverse square law. 
This chief and spectacularly fruitful law of Newtonian science could easily create a 
most portentous illusion about the status of the laws of nature. Was it not tempting 
to assume that the laws of nature were not only accessible to the human mind on an 
a priori basis but were also ontologically necessary in the form in which they were 
unveiled by a priori reasoning? And, if such was the case, could there be any real 
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need for experimentation? More importantly, could there be any need for a 
Creator if nature necessarily had to be what it appeared to be through that very 
same a priori reasoning? 
Such questions about science as well as natural theology could hardly be 
answered in a clear-cut way in the seventeenth century, a transition from Christian 
to secularized thought. Ambivalence, hesitation, and confusion about these 
questions were everywhere in the utterances of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, to say 
nothing of lesser figures with quite a few divines among them, eager to explore the 
new science for the purposes of theology. 19 As to science, the potential pitfalls were 
in full evidence when Galileo slighted Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbits of 
planets. He did so on the patently a priori ground that the heavenly motions had to 
be perfectly circular, a position which allied Galileo with Aristotle, the cosmologist-
scientist, whom he wanted to vanquish above al1. 20 Descartes could never warm up 
to the indispensability of experiments. 21 Had Newton not been the scientific genius 
he was, his philosophical a priorism (with strong Cartesian touches) would have 
weakened his attention to observational evidence on more than a few occasions. 22 
 He was not attentive at all to a very specific question raised by that evidence. If the 
latter was the ultimate truth about the law of nature, what was the true heuristic 
value of the a priori approach? 
This question might have been definitively answered in the seventeenth century 
had its scientific geniuses not represented a transition between Christian and 
secular thought. The minds of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton were not 
sufficiently Christian to perceive the pseudo-deity (be it pantheism or materialism 
or deism) lurking behind a priori thinking. They were, however, sufficiently 
Christian to give no serious consideration to a world without a Creator. Belief in 
creation thoroughly conditioned their minds to think of nature as suffused by 
reason and law even in that sublunary realm which was a realm of disorder for 
pagan minds such as Plato and Aristotle, whatever their intention to celebrate 
cosmic rationality. But if one was to consider in all its consequences the denial of 
an infinitely rational Creator, could the inference be avoided that in such a case no 
rationality whatever could appear in nature? 
This inference was not broadly recognized even when in the nineteenth century 
the secularization of Western thought began to unfold its full logic. Even such a 
master logician as John Stuart Mill failed to recognize the full implications of his 
own speculation about other worlds where two and two would not necessarily 
make four. 23 For in that case there beckoned the specter of absolute contingentism 
against which Mill's 'god' (half good, half evil) was hardly a logical shield. Mill was, 
however, logical to the point of admitting that Hume's notion of the invariability 
of nature's laws as a refutation of miracles rested on the presupposition that God 
does not exist. For as Mill put it, a "miracle is a new effect supposed to be produced 
by the introduction of new cause...; of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there 
can be no doubt." 24 Even less recognition was given during the nineteenth century 
to the fact that absolute contingentism was but a replay of the occasionalism 
advocated by al-Ashari and Ockham. 
At any rate, was the order of nature provided by absolute contingentism or 
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occasionalism different from that radical form of positivism according to which 
the laws of nature are mere commodious devices created by the mind for its own 
convenience to deal with facts? 25 Scientists, who endorsed that theory, did not do 
so to the logical extent of advocating a closure of laboratories. But this conflict of 
their theory with their practice provided no answer to the question as to why there 
was order in nature, that is, why nature obeyed specific laws. Refusal to anchor 
that order in the Creator could but leave one with the fearful prospect of a radically 
random state of affairs. There stones would not regularly fall, but just as likely 
hang in mid-air or take off unexpectedly in any direction. There it would be most 
unlikely that the hatching of a chicken egg would yield a chick. There a flower 
would perpetuate its own kind only as an exceptional case. In other words, in a 
world severed from its Creator, lawfulness would be the miracle, that is, a most 
unexpected event. 
The foregoing examples are a mere paraphrase of the most incisive pages written 
on the laws of nature. The time, 1908, was the high water mark of the worst 
misrepresentation of science once cast in the mold of scientistic ideology. The 
book, not surprisingly, had Orthodoxy for its title. Its author, Gilbert Keith 
Chesterton, was not a scientist, not even a philosopher of science. 26 But he was 
certainly a thinker most independent of the climate of thought of his time if there 
ever was such a thinker. No such independence was evident in the geniuses of the 
seventeenth century, with Pascal being a major exception. A famous remark of his 
portrayed Descartes as the one who really had no need of God. 27 Pascal could have 
just as well stated the same about Galileo, who could exalt the human mind and 
debase the divine mind in the same breath. As he stated that the human mind was 
the greatest marvel of creation, Galileo also equated human knowledge of 
geometry with that of the Creator. 28 From there it was but a step to deriving 
nature's geometrical structure from the mind. Such a nature soon was seen to be in 
no need either of mind or of God. The perception was achieved just a decade or so 
before science came of age through Newton's Principia. In that perception of 
Spinoza, nature and God were made identical which simply excluded the 
possibility of miracles. 29 Much less noted was the most devastating consequence of 
the Spinozian position. It consisted in Spinoza's thorough perplexity about the 
existence of concrete, specific, limited things making up nature and providing 
science with its subject matter. 30 
To be sure, few at that time, and certainly not the scientists, became Spinozians. 
But whereas there was no pressing need for following Spinoza, the question of 
miracles pressed itself on in the measure in which the laws of nature began to 
appear as subtly ultimate entities. Undoubtedly, Newton was sincere as he assigned 
to God's direct action certain arrangements in the physical realm for which his 
science contained no answer. One such arrangement was, according to Newton, 
the separation of fiery from cold matter, or the separation of celestial bodies into 
stars and planets. 31 His other example, the periodic intervention of God to secure 
the stability of the solar system, made a better known intellectual history through 
Laplace's scientific solution to that problem. 32 It was the history of holes in which 
divines, ready to jump on the bandwagon of science without seriously studying it 
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and unwilling to probe an essentially philosophical question to its very bottom, 
were eagerly locating Almighty God as one busy doing what science could not do. 
Many divines, in fact, lost their faith in miracles as they saw those holes being 
filled up with the relentless progress of science. They turned to an increasingly 
radical reinterpretation of biblical miracles culminating in the exegesis of 
Bultmann and in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. 33 They might have saved 
themselves from this intellectual and spiritual debacle had they pondered Newton's 
own position vis-a-vis miracles. Newton's unwillingness to admit the reality of 
biblical miracles never cut ice with unbelievers. It was quite possibly a tactic on 
Newton's part to cover up his Unitarianism, which, if discovered, would have cost 
him the Lucasian chair in Cambridge and, later, the Directorship of the Mint. 
Unbelievers could, of course, be but reassured by Newton's categorical denial of 
Christian miracles postdating New Testament times. 34 Clearly, Newton believed 
less in Christianity than he should have and believed more than a Christian should 
in the laws of science and nature. One wonders whether Newton had ever as much 
as suspected the miracle of creation in the beginning that lurked behind each and 
every law of nature, or the miracle of a nature stable in its orderliness. For only 
with an eye on that miracle can the possibility of miracle be raised meaningfully. 
The miracle of creation in the beginning implies, of course, the Creator's 
sovereign freedom to create or not to create. No less importantly, his creative 
freedom is divine also in the sense that the actual universality of things created by 
him is only one of an infinite number of possibilities at His disposal. Such a 
Creator is not contradicting the rationality and consistency of His creation if it 
includes an intellectual and moral realm which the physical realm is to support and 
serve. With such a notion, and only with such a notion of Creator and creation in 
focus, it was natural to say, as did George G. Stokes, a prominent physicist of the 
late nineteenth-century, "Admit the existence of a God, of a personal God, and the 
possibility of miracle follows at once." 35 The contrast could not have been greater 
with Voltaire's often quoted utterance that "to suppose that God will work 
miracles is to insult Him with impunity." 36 The ground for that insult was, 
according to Voltaire, that a miracle meant the inability on God's part to 
accomplish any particular end by immutable laws. The fallacy of Voltaire's 
reasoning lay in his own inability to see in the realm of existence anything but a 
mere clockwork in which there was no room for free beings. Of human freedom, a 
most immediately evident factual experience, he could speak only with the gravest 
perplexity. 37 
Voltaire was not the first or last worshiper of the laws of nature for whom the 
freedom of the will was a source of continual nightmare. One wonders what 
latter-day Voltaires felt on hearing no less a physicist than Arthur H. Compton 
declare that the evidence on behalf of man's conviction to move his little finger at 
will was immensely greater than all the evidence on behalf of Newton's laws. From 
this it followed, according to Compton, that should a conflict arise between our 
sense of freedom and Newton's physics, it is the latter that needed to be revised. 38 
 Recognition of man's freedom means, of course, the recognition of a moral order 
which alone is to be served by miracles. That they were never for entertaining the 
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curious was called to the attention of the Pharisees and Sadducees of all ages by 
none other than the greatest miracle worker of all times, Jesus of Nazareth. 39 
In 1934, when Compton spoke, Newtonian physics had for some time been 
superseded. The mathematical tools of the new physics—quantum mechanics—
were statistical. They were very different, nay irreducible to pure differential 
equations, which are the backbone of Newtonian physics. Those equations are all 
translatable into geometry in which the lines or curves representing various 
parameters are always continuous. (It may be worth recalling that the Principia's 
mathematics were invariably given in geometrical figures equivalent to what later 
became known as differential geometry.) The geometrical continuity implied, in 
principle at least, the possibility of measuring with perfect accuracy the physical 
processes described by those figures. It was at that point that an elementary error in 
reasoning gained currency among physicists who were then readily echoed by 
philosophers overawed by the success of a field they did not really know. The 
possibility of perfectly accurate measurements became quickly taken as the justifi-
cation of ontological causality in physical interactions. The inference was 
equivalent to putting the cart before the horse. Worse, that mistaken philosophical 
maneuver began to function as the exact foundation of the ideology of immutable 
laws of nature, of absolute physical determinism, and of the absurdity of miracles. 
Spokesmen of that ideology were a dime a dozen. Ironically, their self-
confidence and public acceptance reached its peak just in the decades when the 
handwriting became increasingly visible on the superb edifice of Newtonian 
physics. The decades were the ones saddling the turn of the century. 40 The 
moderately comforting aspect of that intellectual debacle was that some prominent 
men of science had not lent their voice to a chorus wholly out of tune with science. 
Henri Poincare, the foremost mathematical physicist of the time, had for all his 
agnosticism the presence of mind to warn that "it is with freedom that one 
demonstrates complete determinism." 41 Philosophers and divines lacking that 
modicum of common sense were all too numerous. Thus E. Goblot, professor of 
logic at the Sorbonne, wrote "All induction rests on the confidence we have in 
determinism. There is therefore in nature neither contingency nor caprice, nor 
miracle, nor free will; any of these hypotheses ruin our mental ability to reason 
about things."42 The only logical merit in that statement was the juxtaposition of 
miracles and free will. A most glaring fault from the logical viewpoint was Goblot's 
reference to confidence, hardly a matter for rigorous logic. Last but not least, was 
Goblot entitled to praise—and to royalties—for his book if in terms of his 
declaration it was a necessary result of his brain mechanism, or more rudely, of his 
nourishment and lodgings? 
Unintended instructiveness is no less glaring in the declaration of the 
philosopher of religion, A. Sabatier, "Miracles have no basis in modern 
philosophy. The method inaugurated by Galileo, Bacon and Descartes gives to our 
thinking a turn which necessarily excludes it." 43 Such a turn could come about only 
through a very selective reading of those three and of others with whose names 
Newtonian science became synonymous. Whatever the inadequacies of their dicta 
on scientific method, those three certainly wanted no part in an ideology restricted 
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to matter and motion. They would have undoubtedly rejected the declaration of G. 
Seailles, a chief late-nineteenth-century spokesman of empiricist and scientistic 
secularism, "By its principles as well as by its conclusions science excludes 
miracles."" The empiricist Bacon's dismissal of miracles as means never used by 
God "to convert the heathen," was still balanced by his emphasis on the evidence 
which an orderly nature brings to its Creator, 45 a position unacceptable to Seailles 
and his cohorts among empiricists. Seailles could hardly be ignorant of Descartes' 
often quoted dictum "God performed three miracles: the creation of things out of 
nothing, the freedom of the will, and the Incarnation." 46 The point, which the 
scientistic antagonists of miracles might have most profited from and which they 
would have most resented, was also already made in Descartes' century and by no 
less a scientist than Leibnitz: "If geometry were as much opposed to our passions 
and present interests as is ethics, we would contest it and violate it but little less 
notwithstanding the demonstrations of Euclid." 47 The pseudointellectual's sneer-
ing at miracles grew into a crescendo in the decades straddling the turn of the 
century when Christian morals, private and public, which Christian miracles were 
to support above all, became for the first time a major target of secularism. 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
But to return to physics, or rather to the momentous turn it took about that 
time. Of the two new branches of physics representing that turn, one, the theory of 
relativity, offered no direct handle on the question of miracles. It has, however, an 
important indirect bearing on it which is worth recalling in a few words and all the 
more so because it is generally overlooked or simply ignored when set forth. The 
theory of relativity was born out of young Einstein's awe for the intellectual beauty 
of Maxwell's equations. 48 Since beauty is inseparable from form, it was all too 
natural for him to be concerned about the distortion of the simple form of those 
equations as they applied to a reference system moving with respect to the 
observer. Einstein's great insight consisted in perceiving that the transformation of 
those equations from one reference system to another would leave intact their form 
provided the speed of light is taken for something absolute, independent even of 
the speed of its source. A quick recall of the fact that the speed of sound is never 
independent of the motion of its source may help one realize the enormity of the 
departure which the Einsteinian postulate of the absoluteness of the speed of light 
represents with respect to Newtonian physics. In the latter, which is rightly spoken 
of as mechanistic physics, the speed of the propagation of any mechanical or 
physical effect is always a function of the speed of its source. That Einsteinian 
relativity is based on the unconditionally absolute value of the speed of light may 
also help one perceive the measure of skullduggery whereby the relativization of all 
ethical and social values is asserted on the basis of Einstein's relativistic physics. 
The latter is the most absolutist physical theory ever proposed. 49 
The foregoing considerations relate to the theory of special relativity which, with 
its uniformly moving reference systems, is a particular case of the theory of general 
relativity. The latter deals with accelerated frames of reference. Since the most 
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obvious case of acceleration is gravitational motion, it was almost a foregone 
conclusion that Einstein should make an effort to deal with the gravitational 
interaction of all matter. He did so as he presented in 1917 the last of his memoirs 
on general relativity. That memoir was a great first in physics in that it contained 
the first, contradiction-free scientific account of a gravitational universe. 50 The 
importance of this can easily be seen with a recall of the point on which Kant 
staked his critique of the cosmological argument. The point was that science (the 
science of Kant's time as he poorly knew it) provided no contradiction-free account 
of the universe. This is why Kant felt entitled to call the notion of the universe a 
bastard product of the metaphysical cravings of the intellect and, therefore, 
unsuitable to serve as the final and crucial jumping board in the intellectual 
recognition of the existence of the Creator. 51 This objection of Kant continues to 
command credibility only on the part of those unmindful of Einstein's achieve-
ment. The latter should, however, loom large in the eyes of those hopeful about a 
genuine harmony between science and miracles. The latter can rationally be 
discoursed about only if the existence of the Creator and of a moral order 
(inconceivable without Him) are assumed. Einstein's contribution to the scientific 
grasp of the universe should seem therefore of greatest importance. In fact he 
perceived late in his life that his cosmology may be an unintended pointer to the 
One beyond the totality of consistently interacting things which is the universe. 52 
While the indirect support which the theory of relativity brings to miracles 
remains unexploited, quite a vast literature has arisen about the alleged support 
which the other main branch of modern physics, quantum theory, allegedly has for 
miracles. 53 That literature certainly proves the naivete with which theologians try 
to cash in on science even when they are not properly trained in it, or appraise it 
with false philosophical premises. They still have to learn that a wrong starting 
point can only lead to blind alleys regardless of the subject, be it as lofty as theology 
or as down-to-earth as physics. In following up philosophical blind alleys 
theologians have no excuse just because prominent scientists give them the lead. 
Theologians staking their fate and fortunes on the divinity of the Logos, which 
alone makes Christian miracles reasonable and meaningful, should view most 
seriously any misstep in logic, in particular, and philosophy in general. It should 
seem most un-Christian to espouse mental somersaults or plain verbal tricks that 
abound in the literature of the philosophy of quantum mechanics as well as of the 
demythologization of miracles. 54 
As to the philosophy of quantum mechanics, the pattern for somersaulting was 
provided by none other than Heisenberg, one of the architects of quantum 
mechanics and the first to unfold a principal consequence of it. Since its 
formulation in 1927 that consequence has made intellectual history (not 
necessarily coextensive with the history of truth) under the label of the principle of 
indeterminacy or uncertainty principle. A much less misleading label would have 
been the principle of imprecision. For what Heisenberg found was simply that 
measurements of physical interactions involving conjugate variables, such as 
momentum and position, time and energy, will always contain a margin of 
imprecision, which can be significant on the atomic level. (On the level of ordinary 
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perception or macroscopic level, the quantum mechanical imprecision can be 
safely ignored because it is many magnitudes smaller than the probable error 
acceptable for laboratory or industrial practice on that level.) Heisenberg, 
however, jumped to the conclusion that because of the significance of inevitably 
imprecise measurements on the atomic level, the principle of causality should be 
considered as overthrown. 55 
This inference, a sheer non sequitur, was not without an important though often 
overlooked merit. If, indeed, the imprecision in question meant the overthrow of 
causality, the latter could not be salvaged on the ground that the imprecision in 
question is wholly negligible on the macroscopic level of ordinary existence and 
operations. The absence of the ontological factor, causality, in the foundations 
cannot issue in its presence in a superstructure which is their extension. At any rate, 
was Heisenberg right in claiming that there was no causality because of the 
inevitable imprecision of measurements of physical interactions? That question 
should have been answered in the negative. Instead, it was given an affirmative 
answer and to the extent as to become a climate of thought. 56 It was largely 
overlooked that Heisenberg's principle states only the inevitable imprecision of 
measurements on the atomic level. From that principle one can proceed only by an 
elementary disregard of logic to the inference that an interaction that cannot be 
measured exactly, cannot take place exactly. 57 The fallacy of that inference consists 
in the two different meanings given in it to the word exactly. In the first case it has a 
purely operational meaning, whereas in the second case the meaning is decidedly 
ontological. The inference therefore belongs in the class of plain non sequiturs that, 
as a rule, are severely strictured in better-grade courses on introductory logic. 
The alleged demise of ontological causality should have called for a general 
sounding of alarms. For that demise could mean but the opening of a chaotic abyss 
with neither a bottom nor with safe perimeters limiting its extent. A recognition of 
this, coupled with a consistent attention to it, could not be expected either on the 
part of prominent physicists or on the part of those in excessive awe of their mental 
prowess. Einstein's admission that the man of science is a poor philosopher has 
much more to it than meets the eye. He himself failed to suspect this as he lead a 
very small group of physicists who refused to accept the counter-casual twist which 
Heisenberg gave to his principle and which later became the cornerstone of the 
Copenhagen philosophy of quantum mechanics with Niels Bohr and Max Born as 
its chief articulators. Einstein never came to realize fully that his disagreement with 
those two was not so much about causality, which he too equated with the 
possibility of perfectly precise measurements, 58 but with the ontology implied in 
causality, physical or other. It was left for W. Pauli, another prominent physicist, 
to call to this point the attention of Born who grew as much dismayed by his 
inability to convince Einstein as by the cooling of Einstein's feelings toward him. 
But Born could hardly desire much enlightenment from Pauli's scornful remark 
that Einstein's concern for physical reality was not worth more than the medievals' 
debate about the number of angels that could be accommodated on a pinhead. 59 
The inability to articulate the question of ontology underlying the debate on the 
status of causality in the perspective of quantum mechanics took monumental 
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proportion in some lengthy essays of Planck on causality, world order, and 
freedom. 6° Ontology and the consequent distinction of it from the merely 
operational level could hardly emerge on the mental horizon of Planck, a 
professed Neo-Kantian. For him causality was a mental category which did not 
depend at all on the observation of the external world. Within the iron grip of that 
category were, according to Planck, all events, including all mental operations, 
even those of the greatest geniuses. Consequently the freedom of the will as a 
mental decision could be but a practical convenience resulting from the fact that 
our introspection did not permit a fully objective, that is, completely accurate 
evaluation of our motivations. It was that practical impossibility that, according to 
Planck, made even Laplace's superior spirit a free agent. As to the Supreme 
Wisdom or God, Planck refused to discuss whether He too was free only in that 
practical sense, or whether He was not free at all because His nature implied a 
perfectly accurate introspection. 
The word accurate is worth noting because the possibility of accurate, that is, 
quantitatively exact measurements was an integral part of Planck's notion of 
causality. He borrowed it from the physicists' world in which he lived and worked. 
There the notion of causality had been as widely based on the notion of exact 
measurements prior to the advent of quantum mechanics as was the denial of 
causality following the overthrow by quantum mechanics of their practical 
possibility. In a broader cultural consciousness the foregoing shift appeared as a 
departure from a deterministic notion of nature to a non-deterministic one. The 
inference that thereby belief in the freedom of the will received a scientific approval 
was quickly made, and by no less a scientist than Eddington. 61 Much less attention 
was given to his reconsideration of the matter, a few years later, in 1939 to be 
specific, when he declared that his earlier arguments on behalf of the freedom of 
the will on the basis of the uncertainty principle were wholly mistaken. 62 
 References to a new "scientifically" approved approach to the freedom of the will 
kept popping up in the philosophical and theological literature, a story that may be 
worthy of detailed documentation. Philosophers and theologians may not be less 
inclined to learn from the errors of the past than are politicians and scientists. 
That the origins of scientifically-coated rescue operations on behalf of the 
freedom of the will antedate the advent of quantum mechanics shows that 
theologians can be quite naive in trying to cash in on some glittering straws in the 
wind. The simile may seem all the more appropriate because it relates to the 
development of statistical methods in gas theory during the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century. That this development was often appraised well outside 
theological circles as a departure from the deterministic world view is, of course, 
true, but this is not necessarily a guarantee of reliability. As a matter of fact, the 
statistical gas theory was based on a strictly deterministic application of the 
Newtonian laws of motion about the collision of gas molecules taken for perfectly 
elastic and spherical bodies. In such a situation the initial conditions determine 
with complete accuracy any subsequent state, however far removed from the initial 
state. A rigorous interpretation of gas theory did not therefore justify the inference 
that most out-of-the-ordinary configurations were only most improbable but not 
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inherently impossible. They were impossible in the measure in which the initial 
conditions were ordinary or fairly symmetrical configurations or not. When some 
early twentieth-century defenders of miracles reported that "the old rigid system of 
the laws of nature is being broken up by modern science," 63 they were very far from 
reliable scientific grounds which are always very different from current fashionable 
appraisals of the latest in science. The same is true of some scientists who tried to 
discredit miracles by calculating the enormous improbabilities of deviations from 
the ordinary course of nature. The figure 10 1010 given by J. Perrin, a French 
Nobel-laureate physicist, to illustrate the improbability of a tile to deviate from its 
vertical fal1, 64 may impress even the layman by its being incomparably larger than 
all the atoms in the universe and all the microseconds that have elapsed since its 
expansion got under way sixteen billion years ago. 
The super-astronomical improbability of this happening does, however, in no 
way weaken the certainty of that outcome provided the initial conditions are in 
exact conformity with it. But about those initial conditions the scientist could only 
admit his ignorance, although he should have kept in mind that it was that very 
ignorance that prompted him to calculate mere averages. Since the latter were 
useful only for the gaseous state, in which the motion of molecules is extremely 
restricted, the application to miracles was in fact tantamount to specious blowing 
of mere hot air, worthy only of less than average intellects. 
The grafting of scientific respectability on miracles had a far greater appeal with 
the advent of quantum mechanics as it was taken to be equivalent to the 
breakdown.of strict physical determinism. Here again a detailed account of what 
actually happened is still to be written. That there was an early rush of divines to a 
terrain which, as it will be clear later, was a ground where angels would have feared 
to tread, may be gathered from a book of Bernhard Bavink, published in 1933 and 
immediately translated from German into English under the title, Science and 
God. 65 The book was the substance of lectures which Bavink had given in various 
parts of Germany on science and religion. A graduate of the University of 
GOttingen, where he majored in physics, Bavink had a deep interest in theological 
questions. This was almost natural on the part of one who had among his paternal 
forebears Dutch Mennonites and was converted to Lutheranism by his wife, the 
daughter of a pastor. By the early 1930s Bavink had for some years been looked 
upon as a leading Christian interpreter of the relation between science and religion. 
This was due to the half a dozen editions, between 1913 and 1929, of his magnum 
opus that appeared in English translation in 1932 under the title, The Anatomy of 
Modern Science. 66 That miracles and science are not discussed in those editions 
(and in that translation) is an indication of the fresh interest created in that topic by 
the uncertainty principle, still a novelty around 1930 or so. 
In recalling Perrin's calculation of the enormous improbability of a macroscopic 
object, such as a tile, from deviating randomly from its vertical fall, Bavink noted 
that miracles, such as Peter's walking on the water, were macroscopic events where 
the laws of classical mechanics were, with their strict determinism, invariably valid. 
Such was the immediate background for Bavink's warning, "The theological world 
cannot be too strongly warned against attempting to make capital in this way of 
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the new discoveries." 67 
By new discoveries Bavink meant those aspects of modern physics according to 
which the microscopic or atomic level was ruled by chance alone. That chance 
meant for Bavink the absence of physical causality, and not merely our ignorance 
of causes, was suggested by his admission that a world steeped in the haphazard 
may seem much less in keeping with the traditional Christian view of the world as 
thoroughly ordered. Would a world of chance evoke, Bavink raised his typically 
German question, the recognition of the Creator in the same way in which the 
starry realm bespoke to Kant of a cosmic lawgiver? Bavink answered this question 
in the affirmative. His reason was that, after all, nothing happens or exists unless 
God directly brings it about. This meant, in Bavink's resolution of the theological 
question raised by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, that the difference between 
classical physics and the physics of quantum mechanics was very simple. Within 
the former God created the original initial conditions in the Beginning; in the latter 
God keeps creating the initial conditions at every instant and for all events: 
In the literal sense, not a single quantum of action exists in the world 
which does not proceed directly and immediately from God. No 
natural law, not even a statistical one, compels its existence. Such a 
notion is just as meaningless as if we were to imagine that the statistics 
of railway accidents or marriages made one year compel those 
accidents or marriages taking place the next year, to occur. I think that 
the enormous liberation which this insight brings to religious thought 
makes it worth while to accept the apparent chance which it requires. 
For in truth, believers have always hitherto regarded chance as God's 
direct will (Matthew x. 29). This now becomes an evident fact for the 
chance in the final elementary actions of existence is nothing other 
than the completely free decision by God. 68 
None of this should have surprised anyone who had carefully read the first line 
of the paragraph out of which this passage has been taken. There Bavink endorsed 
the "nominalist protests" against classical physics and against the inference that it 
was enough for the regular sequence of physical processes that their initial 
conditions be provided by God. That protest seemed to Bavink so well founded as 
to dispense of the need for going into "any great philosophical trouble of getting rid 
of objections to it." 69 It was, of course, another matter whether it was unreasonable 
to assume that God was capable of creating a physical realm with stable laws which 
He did not have to re-create at every moment but only had to conserve in its 
existence. This age-old Christian distinction between the erstwhile creation of 
things out of nothing and the conservation of the existence of things already 
created did not arise on Bavink's mental horizon. His claim that in the viewpoint 
endorsed by him chance was only apparent, rested on a theology harking back to 
Ockham who sought answer in miraculous interventions by God at every moment 
to essentially philosophical questions. That theology was eager in resorting to 
biblical phrases, such as the one (Matthew 10:21) invoked by Bavink about 
sparrows none of which falls to the ground without the Heavenly Father's willing 
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it. The fact that in many biblical passages the world is spoken of as firmly 
established and that even the endurance of God's covenant is asserted in terms of 
the endurance, stability, and unfailing regularity of his physical creation, 70 did not 
seem to have any relevance for Bavink. 
The problems--scientific, philosophical, and theological--that transpire from the 
few pages Bavink devoted to miracles reappear in one way or another in all the 
subsequent discussions of miracles with an eye on modern physics. That the 
remaining pages will be mostly concerned with two books entirely devoted to 
miracles and modern physics is in part due to their wide availability to English 
readership. Another reason is that their respective authors are both professional 
physicists. One of them, William G. Pollard, is also an Anglican clergyman. The 
other, Donald M. MacKay, showed more than a passing interest in matters 
theological. Most importantly, their discussions are detailed and therefore provide 
their instructiveness in their own terms. 
Pollard would have done better justice to his book had he called it not Chance 
and Providence but "chance is providence" or, perhaps, "chance is your provi-
dence," though not "Providence is your chance." This is not to suggest that by 
Providence he did not mean most emphatically the one portrayed in the Bible. By 
chance he meant the randomness associated with quantum mechanics. He called it 
the "very task" or "primary thesis" of his book to show the full harmony of these 
two viewpoints. 72 It should therefore be no surprise that for Pollard quantum 
mechanics is the last word in physics. Conclusive for him had to be the failures, 
rather numerous by the mid-1950s, of efforts aimed at constructing a quantum 
mechanics with hidden variables, that is, a quantum mechanics which would rest 
on a mathematical formalism allowing for absolute precise measurements in 
principle at least. He undoubtedly found further proof of the statistical character 
of scientific explanation when in the mid-1960s J. S. Bell set forth his famous 
theorem on the impossibility of hidden variable theories. Pollard may have derived 
further assurance when the early 1980s witnessed the completion of experiments 
verifying some consequences of Bell's theorem. 73 Yet, no such theorem or 
experiments would ever dispose of the question whether an operational restriction 
on the precision of measurements is equivalent to an ontological incompleteness of 
the interactions to be measured. To anyone, such as Pollard, not facing up to this 
question, it is natural to state, as he does, that "the world is so constituted that the 
ultimate as well as present characteristic mode of scientific explanation in all fields 
is statistical." 74 (Italics added.) 
Of the three words italicized (above) the first clearly carries an ontological 
meaning. Furthermore, if that meaning is valid, and only then, that is, if the world 
really embodies a basic randomness, the use of the two other italicized words is 
unobjectionable. To Pollard's credit, he is very conscious both of that logical 
connection and of the burden of proof it entails. "In order to establish my primary 
thesis that this is a necessary characteristic of scientific knowledge dictated by the 
nature of things rather than a merely temporary result of inadequate information, 
it is clearly necessary for us to probe much deeper than we have so far." 
Unfortunately, he does not fathom philosophical depths. In the same breath, and 
20 Jaki 
elsewhere too, he reasserts the fundamental ontological status of chance in the 
actual world "in which indeterminacy, alternative, and chance are real aspects of 
the fundamental nature of things, and not merely the consequence of our 
inadequate and provisional understanding." 
Ironically, this statement of Pollard is preceded by his dismissal of Einstein's 
disagreement with the celebration of chance on the basis of quantum mechanics. 
Pollard does so with the characterization of that disagreement as a "philosophical 
conviction." Philosophy fares indeed poorly in Pollard's book. Even elementary 
consistency is in short supply in connection with pivotal terms he uses. Thus he 
states about chance not only that "it cannot be the cause or reason for anything 
happening," but also that "chance and probability in modern physics are...real and 
essential elements of the world which it describes." The last statement implies, of 
course, the question of the value of scientific explanation. This crucial, philo-
sophical problem is never met head-on by Pollard as if he had not heard of the 
countless books written on the subject both prior to and after the advent of 
quantum mechanics. Nor is the question, already aired in this paper, about the 
legitimacy of inference from the operational to the ontological, so much as hinted 
at by him. 
As one living in the physicists' world, he should not be too severely judged. The 
scientific community ignored countless warnings concerning that inference. if not 
the very first, certainly the most concise of those warnings was carried to the four 
corners of the scientific world through a letter that appeared in the December 29, 
1930, issueof Nature, the leading scientific weekly. The concluding sentence of that 
letter written by J. E. Turner, of the University of Liverpool, in connection with a 
prominent physicist's popularization of the chance world of atoms, contained 
more depth than much of the literature celebrating quantum mechanical chance, 
"Every argument that since some change cannot be 'determined' in the absolutely 
different sense of 'caused,' is a fallacy of equivocation." 77 
Whether Pollard perceived something of the sadly inadequate character of his 
reasoning on behalf of universal chance is a secondary matter. Nor is one to be 
appalled by the fact that as a scientist he fell completely under the sway of the 
extraordinary successes of quantum mechanical techniques and took them for 
basic and ultimate explanation. The same happened to countless colleagues of his, 
from the most outstanding to the most ordinary. What should seem to be 
especially instructive within the perspective of this paper is that he failed to perceive 
the devastating consequences devolving for Christian miracles from the very 
method he offered as their only safeguard. For underlying that method there seems 
to be a measure of respect for science as it actually is that may undermine science as 
well as miracles (Providence) by the same stroke. Such undue measure of respect 
lurks between the lines as he states about his stated purpose of showing the full 
harmony of providence (Bible) and science (quantum mechanics). It is "to be 
accomplished in such a way that the essential integrity and unity of science, both as 
it is now and as in principle it may become, is fully preserved." 
Undoubtedly a God who created human reason and is Reason himself deserves 
in full that logike latreia which Saint Paul enjoined (Romans 12:1) on Christians 
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and Pollard may have had in mind. Such worship is incompatible with the 
slighting of anything that human reason can safely ascertain. By the same token 
that same kind of worship assumes as verity that there can be no contradiction 
between the historical revelation (be it in words or in deeds) of such God and His 
self-revelation through nature which according to the same Saint Paul (Romans 
1:20) is irrefutably clear, regardless of the resolve of some to ignore it. But the 
non-existence of contradiction between revelation and reason can only be 
established if careful attention is given to the possible sources of a misrepresenta-
tion of either or both. Contradictions are again bound to loom large if reason is 
limited to science, and even more so if the science of the day is taken for Science in 
its ultimate form. Neither science nor Revelation was served whenever God's basic 
way of action was taken to be equivalent to the workings attributed by that science 
to nature. 
The story, several centuries old by now, is replayed with a new twist in Pollard's 
book. The great success of mechanistic or Newtonian science was a powerful 
motivation for casting God in the role of a clockmaker. But those theologians, 
whom Voltaire merely echoed in celebrating such a God, 79 were not eager to 
project him into the Bible. Pollard, however, is most emphatic in saying two things: 
One is that the idea of a God who suspends now and then the workings of the 
machinery of the world is "almost wholly unbiblical." The other is that only the 
notion of a God continually casting dice (that is doing what the chance of quantum 
mechanics is supposed to represent) is wholly and alone biblical. After taking issue 
with those who speak disparagingly of "mere" chance, Pollard waxes dogmatic: 
To Einstein's famous question expressing his abhorrence of quantum 
mechanics, "Does God throw dicer the Judeo-Christian answer is 
not, as so many have wrongly supposed, a denial, but a very positive 
affirmative. For only in a world in which the laws of nature govern 
events in accordance with the casting of dice can the Biblical view of a 
world whose history is responsive to God's will prevail." 
Before considering the allegedly biblical character of a dice-throwing God it 
should be worth considering the dice in question. Nothing would be more 
mistaken than to think of an ordinary die. The latter has six faces, eight corners, 
twelve edges, all definite parameters with such others as specific weight, elasticity, 
temperature, and so forth. Were God to be using such a die He would have to 
throw it but once. Its first and all subsequent bouncings off from a specific ground 
would strictly follow from the initial conditions of the first throw that could be 
known to God with complete accuracy. Nor would the case be any different were 
the various parameters of the die subject to statistical variations. What had already 
been said about statistical gas theory would apply here too. There one would still 
be within the framework of classical or deterministic physics. While we humans 
can only start from an average value of the parameters, to God all the individual 
cases of possible variations would be equally known and also their actual sequence 
as fully determined by the initial conditions. 
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Quite different would be the case of God throwing a quantum mechanical die. 
The latter, radically different from the ordinary die, would display a random 
variability in the actually existing number of its parameters such as faces, edges, 
corners, etc. This has to be so as long as one does not disavow the very core of the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, the logical somersault 
according to which an interaction that cannot be measured exactly cannot take 
place exactly or rather can take place only with an ontological defect in it. Instead 
of measurement one can, of course, refer to what it presupposes, the specification 
of parameters needed to carry it out. The necessary incompleteness of those 
specifications means, according to the Copenhagen philosophy, an ontological 
incompleteness. 
To supply that defect the Copenhagen camp or the overwhelming majority of 
physicists invokes chance or, as will be seen shortly, their short-sighted wizardry 
with mathematical operators. A theologian-physicist like Pollard, with equal 
allegiance to both of his professions, will of course invoke God in addition to 
chance. The result is that all events in the physical realm (where all events are 
ultimately chance events according to the Copenhagen philosophy) become so 
many direct events actually performed by God, who alone can supply all 
parameters of the die which are (partly or entirely) unspecifiable by quantum 
mechanics and therefore (partly or entirely) non-existent according to that 
philosophy. If, however, such is the case, all natural events become miracles and all 
miracles become strictly natural events. 
To his credit, Pollard minces no words: "It is an error to think of a miracle as 
being 'unnatural.' " (According to him only the moral significance attributed by 
the faithful to very rare events turns them into miracles.) 8 ' To be sure, in another 
passage he restricts that sweeping statement to the "majority of biblical miracles." 
They "are the result of an extraordinary and extremely improbable combination of 
chance and accidents. They do not, on close analysis, involve, as is so frequently 
supposed, a violation of the law of nature." 82 He thinks that in such a way all 
miraculous healings listed in the New Testament are accounted for. As for 
large-scale nature-miracles, such as the one connected with the Exodus, they are 
still but natural coincidences for him. His exegesis is, of course, a rehash of ideas of 
liberal Protestant and modernist divines. He seems to follow them too as he 
ascribes most biblical miracles to the hunger which "late elaborators" of those 
stories had for the miraculous. 83 In fact he retains only three events as miracles: the 
creation of all, the Incarnation and Christ's Resurrection. 
But is there a logical way of saving the reality of these three miracles while 
turning the Gospel account about many others into morality tales however 
exalted? One wonders whether Dr. Pollard thought of the price paid by so many 
liberal theologians for their being ashamed of miracles as so many violations of the 
"sacred" laws of physics. Their fate is grippingly mirrored in the spiritual odyssey 
of Leo Tolstoy who took them for a guide. With his genius of a writer he could 
portray grippingly their starting point as well as their state in the end. The former is 
succinctly given in the precept laid down in a notebook of his where the effort "to 
reinforce the teachings of Christ with miracles" is declared to be equivalent to 
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"holding a lighted candle in front of the sun in order to see better." The end is 
illustrated by Tolstoy's harmony of the four gospels with so many passages cut out 
from the originals as to make a major biographer of his speak of it as "the Gospel 
according to St. Leo."'" Better known is Tolstoy's novel, Resurrection, in which 
Christ's rising from the death is turned into a mere myth, shared, of course, 
communally. 
Almost a hundred years later the Anglican bishop of Durham, Dr. Jenkins, 
served memorable evidence that the principle of demythologization inevitably 
turns, in the hands of a consistent devotee to it, the Gospel account about Christ's 
resurrection into a symbolic communal expression of hope in eternal life. Pollard's 
caveat that the Resurrection of Christ is an individual event and therefore cannot 
concern science, that is, quantum mechanics which deals with aggregates of events, 
is wholly beside the point. Christ's bodily resurrection does not come under the 
competence of quantum mechanics because it is a macroscopic event, though, in its 
terms, it would still ultimately he a chance event for which Pollard should have 
invoked God as the One who supplied ontologically, though "randomly," the 
parameters that would not be specified by quantum mechanics. Nor is this the 
place to deal with Pollard's view that the ultimate truth of miracles rests with the 
faith of the community which endows a very rare event with a -religious signifi-
cance. Here let it suffice to say that such a falling back on communal faith would 
force the Christian to abandon the biblical injunction in terms of which he has to 
render a fully reasoned account of his faith and comportment. The same tactic also 
deprives him of the possibility of challenging on a rational ground others not 
sharing his faith. They--agnostics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Marxists, or 
Voodooists—are given by that tactic the same right to rest their case ultimately on 
their respective shared "faith." Clearly, what Pollard offers as a rational defense of 
Christian miracles is in fact a fearsome boomerang depriving that defense of all 
rationality. 85 
The disservice which Pollard's explanation of miracles does to Christian faith 
derives ultimately from a distortion of the biblical portrayal of God's relation to 
the physical world created by Him. Of that relation Pollard mentions only God's 
full sovereignty over nature and His most intimate involvement in all its events. He 
is silent about another no less noticeable aspect of that relation, namely, the 
constancy, endurance, stability, lawfulness and consistency of the universe and its 
parts. As was already noted, the importance of that aspect is nowhere revealed 
more powerfully than in passages in which God's faithfulness to his covenant with 
David is supported with a reference to the faithfulness and stability with which the 
physical world created by Him follows its course and endures. 
That the biblical world view implies regularity and constancy was briefly 
recognized by Donald M. MacKay, author of the other book to be considered 
here." He did so, however, in a way that runs the risk of destroying the natural 
knowability of those two cosmic qualities. The stability of the solid contents of the 
world is, according to MacKay, declared in the Bible: 
to he a dynamic, contingent, stability. It is only in and through the 
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continuing say-so of their and our Creator that they cohere or "hold 
together." He is the giver of being, moment by moment, to all the 
events in and through which we encounter the world of physical 
objects... But however uncompromisingly realist its tone, the Bible has 
no room for the idea of matter as something eternally self-sufficient or 
indestructible. The Psalmist may praise God for the stability of the 
earth and the reliability of the normal links between events on which 
our rational expectations are based, but the same Book of Psalms 
speaks of a time when the earth and the heavens will perish and will be 
changed "as a vesture" at the will of their Creator. In the end, for 
biblical theism, the only solid reality is God and what God holds in 
being. 87 
What this account leaves out of consideration is whether all those beings are 
kept by God in existence from moment to moment or are created anew out of 
nothing at every moment. MacKay's inveighing against what he calls the Greco-
Medieval view of the cosmos consisting of "necessary natures" known by a priori 
reasoning is part of that partial vision. 88 It suggests that he cannot or is not willing 
to conceive of a "nature" which in itself is only one of the niany possibilities 
available for God's creation but which by being a "nature" assures that it is 
maintained by God in existence in conformity to it. MacKay's oversight of the 
medieval philosophical and theological thinking (so critical of the Greeks on at 
least three crucial points) as the spark of the rise of modern science 89 is a corollary 
of his broader and distinctly Calvinist (Ockhaniist) perspective. 
This should be no surprise. From the moment Calvin (or Ockham) rose against 
apostolic succession, they rose against ecclesial or sacramental continuity across 
time. To buttress philosophically their break with historic continuity they were 
instinctively pushed toward a world view steeped in discontinuities, that is, toward 
a Nature without "natures." No wonder MacKay is pushed by the logic of his own 
position to asserting that continuity and objectivity in nature can only be known by 
one's surrendering to biblical revelation, or rather to MacKay's reading of it. Thus 
in discussing the lure of quantum theory, which challenges the distinction between 
the observers and the observed, and the lure of relativity theory, which challenges 
the validity of a single description of the world valid for all observers, MacKay 
concludes: "True our Christian scientist in God's world may have no access to the 
Creator's eye view of his situation; but because he knows that he is under judgment 
by that criterion, he is saved from the trap of confusing relativity with a denial of 
objectivity."" 
It is the same condition of standing under the judgment of biblical revelation as 
he interprets it that saves Mac Kay's believing scientist from the pitfalls of quantum 
theory. This declaration of MacKay is all the more instructive because he does not 
invoke revelation or biblical perspective as an indispensable ground for recogniz-
ing that Einstein's opponents "had no rational grounds for claiming that the 
absence of an observable causal precedent for an event meant that it had no causal 
precedent." 91 But no sooner had MacKay seemed to sight the ontological 
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perspective of the problem, he lost sight of it, or perhaps he deliberately tried to 
cover it up with a theological smokescreen which is, however, rather transparent. 
For the question is not whether God can play dice in a manner worthy of Him. The 
question is once more about the way in which the parameters or details that cannot 
be specified by quantum mechanics become presently existing in order to let things 
go. MacKay tries to resolve that question on the basis that God is most directly 
involved in all events as a Sovereign Lord over all his creation. But in doing so he 
merely sidesteps the problem which once more surfaces as he states: "From a 
biblical standpoint it would be equally mistaken to argue that if there were no 
causal precursor for an event, then its Creator must be thought of as 'playing 
dice.' "92 For the absence of a causal precursor, or even the partial absence of such 
a precursor, is an ontological gap. Does it fall upon MacKay's "biblical God" to fill 
that gap with continual instantaneous creations? That such is indeed the thrust of 
MacKay's reasoning may be surmised from his further talking around the problem 
without being ready to meet it head on: 
The God of biblical theism is beholden to none to account for his 
creative agency. If he freely wills into being a succession of events in 
which one half of the sub-microscopic details at any time are 
unspecified by their precursors, this would involve no inconsistency 
with his character, still less with his sovereignty, as portrayed in the 
Bible. Belief in a sovereign God does not in the least entail a belief that 
there must be "hidden physical variables" sufficient to determine the 
beh-aviour of electrons on the basis of precedent. For biblical theism all 
events, equally, with or without precursors according to precedent, 
need God's say-so in order that they occur at all. The choice of "God or 
Chance" is simply not a meaningful alternative, if "Chance" is meant in 
the scientific sense. As the Book of Proverbs (ch. 16, v. 33) has it: "The 
lots may be cast into the lap, but the issue depends wholly on the 
Lord."93 
Whatever the appropriateness of that particular biblical passage, MacKay's 
banking on God's sovereignty seems to be very inappropriate. The issue is not that 
God is sovereign but whether He is at least as rational as human beings are. The 
latter can clearly recognize the difference between being and non-being. It is that 
difference which is the real issue concerning the theory of hidden variables. 
Whether most professional supporters and opponents of that theory have realized 
this is irrelevant. As was already stated, physicists have for centuries been apt to 
limit their vistas to quantitatively exact measurements and this is why they have 
taken it for mechanical (and implicitly for ontological) causality. Insofar as hidden 
variables have an ontological relevance, the biblical God, whose self-revealed 
name I AM WHO I AM is ontology incarnate, 94 is bound to provide them in one 
way or another. MacKay seems to suggest that He does so by continually creating 
out of nothing at least one half of the ontological specifications of all atoms to fill 
the ontological gaps created by quantum mechanics or rather by its Copenhagen 
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pseudo-philosophy. 
In a manner characteristic of the entire Ockhamist tradition that heavily 
conditioned the Reformers' theologizing (for all their dislike for philosophy), 
MacKay goes straight to God's sovereignty as if this could dispose of a plain 
question whether the existence or non-existence of certain things is meant by some 
staple phrases of quantum mechanics. No wonder that he sees but the veneer of the 
fallacy of setting up Chance as a kind of anti-deity standing for chaos and absence 
of meaning. 95 He fails to see that the basic issue about chance is whether it can be a 
substitute for reality, be it the reality of physical parameters that "do not exist" 
because quantum mechanics cannot specify them. Understandably, MacKay did 
his utmost to make it appear that his train of thought did not force him to charge 
God with the task of supplying the reality of those unspecified parameters with 
special creative acts performed every split second. His fellow scientists would have 
been taken aback, though not for the right reason. The latter, not a matter of 
theology but of plain philosophy, could not, however, be seen by the ones who had 
bartered sound reasoning about reality for the hollow glitter of mathematical 
operators which give no certainty about anything real, let alone about miracles and 
Providence in human history. 
PERENNIAL PERSPECTIVES 
Certainty about real events or things, usual or unusual, can never begin with 
science, and not even with "the Lord's quantum mechanics" 96 as Schrodinger once 
spoke in quasi-mystical awe of his own specialty. Science rather presupposes real 
things in order to ascertain their quantitative properties; it cannot provide any of 
those uncountable things. Of course, nothing reveals so forcefully the reality of 
things as their limitedness which has many quantitative components. But whether 
they, or the things in which they are embedded, do exist or not is not a scientific 
question. Being a question about the real, it cannot be answered except by a 
philosophy which provides the perennially proper place for the question. To be 
sure, even idealist philosophies make claim to reality, to say nothing of the 
philosophies known as rationalism, empiricism, sensationism and pragmatism. 
They all claim to be the place for the real. But not the proper or primary place. 
They are indeed betrayed by their labels, which are almost always the choice of 
their chief articulators. Those labels invariably relate to an aspect of the real insofar 
as it can be conceptualized, sensed, tested, manipulated and so forth. 
None of those philosophies would carry their special labels if the very start of 
their program and method would be an unconditional acknowledgment of 
external reality. Only that acknowledgment is a guarantee of its being known with 
certainty. This may appear a kind of plain arguing in a circle. Actually, it is the only 
starting point which can save one from arguing ever in such a way. It is a 
consciously and methodically-taken starting point. A chief recommendation of 
that method is that all other philosophical approaches to knowing the real with 
certainty have turned out to be so many seeds of doubt about reality or means 
whereby the thinking man found himself cut off from the external world. Cartesian 
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rationalism that aimed at complete certainty (equating it with mathematics which 
is a series of tautologies, however useful) led to Spinoza's perplexity about any and 
all finite real things. 97 Francis Bacon's empiricist "instauration" of a new age in 
thinking revealed in Hume's hands the fragmentation through it of all judgment 
about reality. Kant's effort to restore certitude through the a priori character of 
mental categories led in Fichte's hands to the exaltation of the will and, in Hegel's 
hands, to the divinization of the individual ego, the least reliable commodity one 
can think of. The sensationism advocated by Mach locked him in solipsism which 
is undoubtedly the highest conceivable measure of certainty although not 
communicable. As to pragmatism, its chief spokesmen, William James and John 
Dewey, would in vain try today to disavow the uncertainty which it has generated 
about everything except, of course, one's selfish and all too often very transient 
success. 
The other chief recommendation for taking the certainty of knowing external 
reality for the starting point in all philosophy is that any refutation of it implies 
knowledge of that type. Thus to argue that a specific registering of a fact, thing, or 
event was a mere hallucination, one must assume that it is possible not to be under 
its influence in registering this or that fact. The same holds true about the argument 
based on any partial deception or error of one's senses or on any exaggerated claim 
about the extent of one's observations. Those "critical" philosophers who have 
succeeded in spreading the belief that nothing can be known unless first critically 
proven have in fact assumed this very knowledge without first critically proving it. 
Moreover, just as colors cannot be discoursed upon in terms of non-colors, the 
knowledge of external reality cannot be proven in terms of knowing only one's 
mind, "critical" or not. 98 
This is basically all that is needed to show the certainty of facts called miracles. 
The all in question may sound very little, but actually it is co-extensive with that 
largest entity called the world of the real, and also co-extensive with all reasoned 
discourse relating to it. In a sense that all is very restricted as it is ultimately reduced 
to the evidence of one's unaided senses. This may appear ridiculously little in an 
age of science that probes such realms of the very small and the very large that are 
inconceivably beyond the reach of the senses. It should not, however, be forgotten 
that the ultimate certainty of all the esoteric findings of science in the farthest 
reaches of space and in the deepest layers of matter rests on the reliability of the 
senses that register the position of ordinary pointer needles. This is what no less an 
"idealist" physicist than Eddington recognized when he stated that "molar physics 
has the last word in observation for the observer is molar." 99 And if the physicist 
takes no stock of this, he can embroil himself in the kind of embarassment which 
left speechless for a moment the famed astronomer-cosmologist W. H. McCrea. 
After being heard to state in a lecture that the star images seen through the 
telescopes have a strict relation to reality only insofar as they are sensations on the 
retina, he was asked in the question-answer period: "Would you also hold the same 
about the reality of the wall which you are facing?" His answer, "I am not really 
sure," speaks for itself. 10° Not even that much comment is deserved by the 
inconsistency of those astronomers (some world-famous) who after boasting of 
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their solipsism during dinner, 101 do not blush as they spend the night looking 
through their telescopes. 
Immediate direct observation of things and the certainty of that observation (or 
at least the certainty with which it can be corrected or improved) is the rock bottom 
basis not only of philosophy but of science as well. In view of this and of what 
already has been said about the true status of scientific laws, it should not be 
difficult to perceive the disingenuousness of the indignation with which miracles 
are denounced as violations of the laws of nature. The indignation is essentially a 
clever form of the strategy: attack is the best defense. But if it is impossible to start a 
march (physical or mental) with the second step, concern about the laws of nature 
should give second place to concern about man's ability to register things and 
events with certainty. And since without that ability nothing can be known about 
the laws of nature, the chief intellectual concern should be not so much about the 
possible violations of the laws of nature as about the actual violation, if not plain 
rape, of man's mind whose natural function is to know reality with immediate 
certitude. 
Such a rape is committed when individuals reporting extraordinary events, and 
in fact lay down their lives on behalf of their witness, are declared at the outset to be 
hotheaded enthusiasts, uncritical minds, or plain fakers. This is done on the 
patently dogmatic ground that nature cannot change its course. Those taking that 
ground rape their own intellect to the point of declaring that they cannot even have 
one. A startling admission of this came from such a prominent spokesman of the 
absolute unchangeability of "nature's laws" (a form of sheer materialism) as J. B. S. 
Haldane: 
If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms 
in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They 
may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound 
logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be 
composed of atoms. 102 
The defense of miracles done with an eye on physics should include a passing 
reference to meteorites. Characteristic of the stubborn resistance of scientific 
academies to those strange bits of matter was Laplace's shouting, "We've had 
enough such myths," when Pictet, a fellow academician, urged a reconsideration 
of the evidence provided by "lay-people" as plain eyewitnesses./ 03 Laymen were 
they in the sense that they had no telescopes, no training in celestial mechanics, no 
knowledge of trajectories, azimuth, right and left ascension. But they could 
register with absolute certainty that a fiery body had just hit the ground nearby 
and could unerringly distinguish its still warm stony remains as something not 
belonging to the soil around it. That such a kind of witnessing stands in its own 
right was the point recognized by a doctor on being confronted with the objection 
of a colleague who insisted that the wide-open fracture below the left knee of Pieter 
De Rudder (1822-1898), the subject of possibly the most startling cure related to 
Lourdes, could not be accepted for a fact because the two ends of the broken bone 
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protruding through the skin had not been certified by a medical commission. The 
reply of that rightly indignant physician, "it does not take a tailor to see that a coat 
is full of holes,"/ 04 contains an instructiveness that is practically inexhaustible. 
The case of sighting meteorites, however extraordinary, is not the same as the 
case of miracles. Unlike meteorites that repeat themselves, any given miracle is a 
strictly individual event that cannot be expected to occur again. Again, unlike the 
fall of a meteorite, always a purely physical event, a miracle is also a historical 
event, however physical it may be. Its verification, even in the case of a fresh 
miracle, is essentially one involving the historical method with its reliance on direct 
witnesses, on indirect observation, and circumstantial evidence. This is why 
ancient miracles as objects of historical verification are a much more difficult 
matter than are recent miracles. Only upon the latter does beat "the bright light of 
modern history," to recall a felicitous expression of that famed Jewish novelist 
Franz Werfel in his introduction to The Song of Bernadette, his memorable 
reconstruction of what happened at Lourdes. 105 
For all his certainty about the miracles of Lourdes, and for all his gratitude to 
the Lady of its Grotto and to the memory of her humble maidservant Bernadette 
Soubirous (whose body he knew to lie incorrupt in a glass casket in Nevers), Werfel 
did not become a Christian, a Catholic. As to Alexis Carrell, who received in 1912 
the Nobel Prize for his study of the rate at which wounds heal, he first went in 1903 
to Lourdes, 106 where incredibly fast healing of festering wounds had by then been 
attested for almost half a century. Yet, it was not until 1940 or so that Carrell was 
able to get rid of all his agnostic reservations and become a Christian, a Catholic, 
although long before that he had known of the powerful argument that reason 
could forge from an attentive consideration of those cures. The argument had 
already been voiced on more than one occasion when in 1909 Teilhard de Chardin 
cast it into a classic form with his powerful prose: 
If a common antecedent for the cures could only be discovered; if we 
could extract from all these authentic facts something which marks 
them off or conditions them! But we find only this: Lourdes; and it is 
not the Lourdes imagined or hoped for in the excitement of pilgrim-
ages...but it is Lourdes alone—Lourdes, a naked and objective reality, 
to which is attached a mysterious virtue, independent of anything the 
sick and the praying crowds can take there. 
If the cures of Lourdes were characterized by any family likeness, 
attached to one category of diseases or appeared under determinate 
circumstances of time or place, I might invoke with show of reason, 
some magnetism, some appropriate vibration with which the human 
body would enter into a vivifying resonance. The precise cause would 
escape me, but a certain regularity in the phenomena would assure me 
of the existence of this cause and entitle me to imagine it. But there is 
nothing of the kind...effects follow each other without apparent rule. 
These cures are distributed as if by chance, and sometimes there are 
alarming relapses. In all truth, what renders Lourdes altogether extra- 
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medical is less what occurs there than the manner in which the 
prodigies take place. If what happens there astonishes the scientists, 
the way it happens is absolutely beyond him. 107 
The purpose of this paper was to call attention to the role which the recognition 
of "naked and objective reality" (or of plain facts) plays in the philosophy that 
alone can do justice to facts be they so extraordinary as to be called miracles. The 
chief recommendation of that philosophy is that it alone can cope also with the 
facts of ordinary life as well as with the facts which science carefully isolates for its 
purposes. For even in the systematic isolation or carefully controlled conditions 
which science demands for its facts, their usefulness ultimately depends on the 
reliability of plain human witness about them. Without that witness not only the 
vast enterprise known as scientific endeavor would lose its claim to truth, but also 
the far more vast social life would be deprived of right to justice. Courts of all 
levels, governments of all jurisdiction, depend on witnesses and their plain 
witnessing" and so do laboratories. In none of those forums can a discrimination 
against plain witnessing of unusual facts be condoned or else the most important 
cases may be prejudged and the only avenues for progress be blocked. Had Oersted 
refused to believe his eyes when they noted that the magnetic needle which he 
placed under a live wire turned in a direction which he believed to be impossible, 
the discoveries of Faraday and Maxwell might not have followed as they did. The 
discovery of the world of atoms depended on Roentgen's chance witnessing the 
formation,. that was not expected to happen, of the negative image of a key on a 
photographic plate. Far more importantly, would Newtonian science have 
developed at all if Kepler had not unconditionally trusted Tycho Brahe's eyes in 
making countless naked-eye observations about the positions of the planet Mars? 
Luckily for science, it witnesses relatively rarely the brushing aside of a report 
about a really new case with the remark: "It cannot be really different from the 
thousand other cases we have already investigated." The brave reply of the young 
assistant, "But, Sir, what if this is the thousand and first case?" which after more 
than half a century is still whispered in the corridors of psychoanalysis,I 09 is 
precisely the rejoinder which is to be faced in connection with facts that fall under 
suspicion because of their miraculous character. 
The witnessing of facts is, of course, to be coupled with a willingness to face up to 
the consequences of the fact witnessed. If the author of the Book of Joshua did not 
mean an extremely dark cloud cover in speaking about the stopping of the sun "in 
the middle of the sky" and staying there "for a whole day" (Joshua 10:13), 11) then 
one has on hand astronomical consequences that even from a distance of three 
thousand years could be verified. No other biblical miracle would pose a similar 
problem. Such physical miracles as the multiplication of the bread, the changing of 
water into wine, Christ's and Peter's walking on the water, represent disturbances 
that cannot be detected from a distance of two thousand years. This would be the 
case even if they were to be contemporary events. The reason for this is not so 
much the relative minuteness of the physical effect they represent, but the 
impossibility of making the scientific apparatus ready for the event. This is not to 
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say that there would not be countless men of science ready to stand by with all sorts 
of sensors to register the physical parameters of a physical miracle, including the 
rapid healing of festering wounds, of broken bones, of collapsed lungs, and of 
lumps of cancerous tissues. But those men of science would in vain wait for an 
invitation from on High or from any of the Almighty's saintly agents. Miracles are 
not for order. They never were. 
This is the only point about miracles which puts the believer at a disadvantage. 
Humiliating it may be, but a humiliation fully consistent with the humble 
framework in which the two Covenants were offered to man across the span of 
over a dozen centuries. An insignificant corner of the earth was chosen to be the 
scene of both Covenants. The chosen recipient was a people that should seem most 
insignificant compared with the cultural, artistic, and organizational magnificence 
of great neighboring civilizations. There is, of course, a silver lining inside that 
humiliation, a silver lining which is nothing short of a miracle: a unique 
interpretation of history, human and cosmic, physical and moral, compared with 
which all other interpretations, ancient or recent, are a poor second. That 
ultimately the rise of science was sparked by that interpretation' is hardly a point 
to let drift from focus in the often theatrical confrontation of miracles with science. 
No humiliation is involved in the fact that miracles are never automatically 
overwhelming proofs. They represent the challenge of external reality, not of 
axioms of logic." 2 That true miracles are never coercive, whatever their occasional 
impact on skeptics and scoffers, is their chief recommendation. A dispensation 
would never be truly divine that would take man's freedom away because such a 
dispensation would not also be fully human. Clearly, it all depends on the 
perspective or, to use the technical term, philosophy or epistemology. That all, not 
only miracles but everything else, depends on it is implied in the recognition that, to 
borrow a forceful phrase from a famed analysis of the origins of modern science, 
"the only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing."' " What the 
author actually meant was the very opposite of the meaning which is usually 
ascribed to metaphysics: the art of bartering facts for ideas. Unfortunately, the 
author in question did not know of the only metaphysics, Aristotelian-Thomistic 
metaphysics, that begins with the recognition of facts and claims in fact that all the 
rules (categories) of man's mental operations are a distillation from his registering 
of facts." 4 
To approach any subject, be it the subject of miracles, in any other way will land 
the mind in mirages as witnessed by the despair of modern man about his intellect. 
That man will find help only from those Christians who have not lost sight, even 
for a moment, of the truly realistic epistemology. Such Christians and only such 
can fully seize their intellectual opportunity which is offered by those unbelievers 
who at least admit the fact of certain extraordinary events, though not their 
miraculous character. They are at one with T. H. Huxley who urged that 
unreserved attention be given to all facts, however extraordinary. They would 
emulate also that Huxley who, following the death of his first son at the age of 
seven, firmly declined the comfort of Christian perspectives. Huxley did so with a 
profession of faith in the facts of nature as seen by science as he understood it: 
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Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the 
great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of entire 
surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child, 
prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly 
wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall learn 
nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I 
have resolved at all risks to do this. " 5 
The defender of Christian miracles should, of course, be able to demythologize 
that notion of science which Huxley in the same context made an object of worship 
with his eyes fixed on the inverse square law, in obvious ignorance of its not 
entirely "scientific" provenance: 
It is no use to talk to me of analogies and probabilities. I know what I 
mean when I say I believe in the law of the inverse squares, and I will 
not rest my life and my hopes upon weaker convictions. I dare not if I 
would." 6 
But even with that demythologization of science done, the Christian defender of 
miracles must tirelessly return to them insofar as they are facts, and insist that they 
be faced with the openness of a child. He can do no more than that teenage peasant 
girl, Bernadette Soubirous, whose mental aplomb under endless questioning was 
no less a miracle than the cures her visions had triggered. To a visitor pressing her 
with doubts about those visions, she gave this reply of astonishing balance: "Je suis 
chargee de vous le dire, je ne suis pas chargee de vous le faire croire." 117 This is all a 
Christian can do about miracles. He has to reassert them as facts in all their details 
and context but he should under no circumstances confuse the skillful and honest 
presentation of facts with the art of convincing. About miracles, however factual, 
conviction is a matter of God's grace which, however, has an intimate tie to facts, 
however miraculous, that can be heard, seen and touched. It is these very terms 
that are the object of a perception which is as sensory as it is an understanding or 
episteme. A biblical proof of this is the very start of the first epistle of John, a 
casting of the entire Christian message into a realist epistemological frame: 
This is what we proclaim to you: 
what was from the beginning, 
what we have heard, 
what we have looked upon, 
and our hands have touched— 
we speak of the word of life." 8 (Italics added) 
Clearly, this kind of epistemology stands somewhere in the middle between the 
classic extremes of positivism and idealism. In positivism, the tangible facts can 
never lead to metaphysical heights, let alone to heights where the Word of Life is 
heard. In idealism, the metaphysical heights are not supposed to be rooted in that 
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reality which human touch and sight alone give access to. Only when imbued with 
a median epistemology will Christians be liberated from a veneer of sophistication 
about miracles which is but a throwback to a leery Humean scepticism. Only then 
will they instinctively avoid either ending or beginning their discussion of miracles 
with the despondent sigh, a transparent admission of an intellectual failure of the 
nerve: "Miracle was once the foundation of all apologetics, then it became an 
apologetic crutch, and today it is not infrequently regarded as a cross for 
apologetics to bear."" 19 Only when Christians will relearn to glory in their minds as 
an organ whose natural function is to have certainty about facts and things, will 
they be able to derive intellectual glory from miracles. On that certainty and on it 
alone can that intellectual platform be built which provides proper perspective 
about science, about miracles, and even about God insofar as He can be grasped by 
that reason which makes man a being created in His very image. 
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